Moral Suasion: An alternative tax policy strategy? Evidence from a controlled field experiment in Switzerland
AbstractIn a controlled field experiment in Switzerland this paper analyses the effects of moral suasion on the timely paying and filling out of the tax form 2001, and the honesty regarding the declaration of domestic income from capital gains, lottery winnings, and certain insurance benefits. Comparisons of different tax filling years and multiple regression estimations have been done using these three factors as dependent variables to check if there is a significant difference between the control group and the treatment group, controlling for additional factors that might influence compliance behaviour. In February 2002 the treatment group received a letter signed by the commune?s fiscal commissioner containing normative appeals. Results indicate that moral suasion has hardly any effect on taxpayers? compliance behaviour. The strongest effect can be observed for the variable tax payments.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) in its series CREMA Working Paper Series with number 2004-01.
Date of creation: Jan 2004
Date of revision:
tax compliance; morale suasion; field experiment;
Other versions of this item:
- Benno Torgler, 2004. "Moral suasion: An alternative tax policy strategy? Evidence from a controlled field experiment in Switzerland," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 235-253, November.
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2005-06-05 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2005-06-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2005-06-05 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2005-06-05 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2005-06-05 (Public Economics)
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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