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The Economics of Taxpayer Compliance

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  • Pyle, D J
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    Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Economic Surveys.

    Volume (Year): 5 (1991)
    Issue (Month): 2 ()
    Pages: 163-98

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    Handle: RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:5:y:1991:i:2:p:163-98

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    Cited by:
    1. Paolo Pellizzari & Dino Rizzi, 2012. "Citizenship and Power in an Agent-based Model of Tax Compliance with Public Expenditure," Working Papers 2012_24, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", revised 2012.
    2. Paolo Pellizzari & Dino Rizzi, 2011. "A Multi-Agent Model of Tax Evasion with Public Expenditure," Working Papers 2011_15, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    3. Alm, James & Torgler, Benno, 2006. "Culture differences and tax morale in the United States and in Europe," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 224-246, April.
    4. Dino Rizzi, 2012. "Tax Evasion Indices and Profiles," Working Papers 2012:37, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", revised 2012.
    5. Hashimzade, Nigar & Myles, Gareth D. & Page, Frank & Rablen, Matthew D., 2014. "Social networks and occupational choice: The endogenous formation of attitudes and beliefs about tax compliance," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 134-146.
    6. Juan Molero & Francesc Pujol, 2012. "Walking Inside the Potential Tax Evader’s Mind: Tax Morale Does Matter," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 105(2), pages 151-162, January.
    7. Eisenhauer, Joseph G., 2008. "Ethical preferences, risk aversion, and taxpayer behavior," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 45-63, February.
    8. Benno Torgler, 2003. "Beyond Punishment: a tax compliance experiment with taxpayers in Costa Rica," Revista de Analisis Economico – Economic Analysis Review, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines, vol. 18(1), pages 27-56, June.
    9. Daniel Sutter & Lee Coppock, 2003. "The Tax Man Cometh: Constitutional Principles for Tax Enforcement," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 107-118, June.
    10. Torgler, Benno, 2003. "To evade taxes or not to evade: that is the question," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 283-302, July.
    11. Soliman, Amal & Jones, Philip & Cullis, John, 2014. "Learning in experiments: Dynamic interaction of policy variables designed to deter tax evasion," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 175-186.

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