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Blood and Ink! The Common-Interest-Game Between Terrorists and the Media

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  • Bruno S. Frey
  • Dominic Rohner

Abstract

It has often been pointed out in the literature that a symbiotic relationship exists between terrorist groups and the media. As yet, however, no formal model has been built based on this issue and only very little empirical research has been done in this field. The present contribution builds a simple game theoretic model, focussing on the social interactions between terrorists and the media. The model has features of a common-interest-game and results in multiple equilibria. After a discussion of the policy implications of the model, an empirical analysis is performed. Using newspaper coverage, terror incidents and terror fatalities data, it is shown that media attention and terrorism do mutually Granger cause each other, as predicted by the model. Moreover, it is explained why terror attacks tend to be ?bloodier? in developing countries than in Europe and the United States.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) in its series CREMA Working Paper Series with number 2006-08.

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Date of creation: Mar 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cra:wpaper:2006-08

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Keywords: Terrorism; media; common-interest-game; coordination; conflict;

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  1. Carlsson, H. & Damme, E.E.C. van, 1990. "Global games and equilibrium selection," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1990-52, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Matthew A. Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2004. "Media, Education and Anti-Americanism in the Muslim World," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(3), pages 117-133, Summer.
  3. John Scott, 2001. "Media congestion limits media terrorism," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(3), pages 215-227.
  4. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
  5. Frey, Bruno S. & Luechinger, Simon, 2004. "Decentralization as a disincentive for terror," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 509-515, June.
  6. David M. Frankel & Stephen Morris & Ady Pauzner, 2001. "Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1336, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  7. Azam, Jean-Paul, 2003. "Suicide-Bombing as Inter-Generational Investment," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 234, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  8. David P. Myatt & Hyun Song Shin & Chris Wallace, 2002. "The Assessment: Games and Coordination," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(4), pages 397-417.
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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. A climate of terror?
    by David Holmes, Senior Lecturer, Communications and Media Studies at Monash University in The Conversation on 2014-08-11 02:11:42
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Cited by:
  1. Caruso, Raul & Schneider, Friedrich, 2013. "Brutality of Jihadist terrorism. A contest theory perspective and empirical evidence in the period 2002–2010," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 685-696.
  2. Axel Dreher & Justina A. V. Fischer, 2010. "Government Decentralization As A Disincentive For Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(4), pages 981-1002, November.
  3. Friedrich Schneider & Tilman Brück & Daniel Meierrieks, 2010. "The Economics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Survey (Part II)," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1050, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  4. Gould, Eric D. & Klor, Esteban F., 2009. "Does Terrorism Work?," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 7589, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Dominic Rohner, 2010. "From rags to rifles: deprivation, conflict and the welfare state," IEW - Working Papers 463, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  6. Beckmann, Klaus & Reimer, Lennart, 2014. "Dynamiken in asymmetrischen Konflikten: eine Simulationsstudie," Working Paper 147/2014, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg.
  7. Athina Economou & Christos Kollias, 2012. "Terrorism and Political Self-Placement in European Union Countries," Economics of Security Working Paper Series 73, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  8. Dominik Noe, 2013. "Determinants of the duration and ending of terrorist and other non-state armed groups," Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers 140, Courant Research Centre PEG, revised 19 Sep 2013.
  9. Meyer Sunniva F., 2011. "Preventing Mass Killings: Determining the Optimal Allocation of Security Resources between Crowded Targets," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-37, September.
  10. Prieto-Rodríguez, Juan & Rodríguez, Juan Gabriel & Salas, Rafael & Suarez-Pandiello, Javier, 2009. "Quantifying fear: The social impact of terrorism," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 803-817, September.
  11. Hendel, Ulrich, 2012. ""Look like the innocent flower, but be the serpent under't": Mimicking behaviour of growth-oriented terrorist organizations," Discussion Papers in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics 13998, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  12. Roland Hodler & Dominic Rohner, 2012. "Electoral terms and terrorism," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 181-193, January.

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