Taxation and Conditional Cooperation
AbstractWhy so many people pay their taxes, although fines and audit probability are low, has become a central question in the tax compliance literature. Concepts of Homo Economicus, endowed with a more refined motivation structure, help to shed light on the tax compliance puzzle. This paper provides empirical evidence for the relevance of conditional cooperation, using survey data from 30 European countries. The findings suggest that a higher perceived tax evasion leads to a lower tax morale, also when controlling for additional factors in a multivariate analysis.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) in its series CREMA Working Paper Series with number 2004-20.
Date of creation: Aug 2004
Date of revision:
tax morale; tax compliance; tax evasion; pro-social behavior;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
- H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2005-06-05 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2005-06-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CFN-2005-06-05 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-PBE-2005-06-05 (Public Economics)
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