(In)Transparency of Information Acquisition: A Bargaining Experiment
AbstractWe analyze how transparency affects information acquisition in a bargaining context, where proposers may chose to purchase information about the unknown outside option of their bargaining partner. Although information acquisition is excessive in all our scenarios we find that the bargaining outcome depends crucially on the transparency of the bargaining environment. In transparent games, when responders can observe whether proposers have acquired information, acceptance rates are higher. Accordingly, in transparent bargaining environments information is more valuable, both individually and socially.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 5817.
Date of creation: Sep 2006
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-10-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2006-10-28 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2006-10-28 (Game Theory)
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