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Empirical models of discrete choice and belief updating in observational learning experiments

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  • Dominitz, Jeff
  • Hung, Angela A.

Abstract

Subjects in economics experiments are often asked to choose an action from a set of discrete choices. The logit-QRE approach to analyse these data places strong restrictions on how subjects in information cascades experiments extract information from observed outcomes and how they update beliefs in response to new information. We add a belief elicitation procedure to the experimental design that allows us to measure directly both the inferences drawn from publicly announced decisions and how beliefs are updated in response to new information. The reported beliefs tend to be well calibrated to frequentist probabilities and also predict individual choices. Contrary to previous conclusions, we find that respondents do not tend to overweight private information when updating beliefs. Our analysis suggests that the earlier findings arise because identification of the discrete choice model relies on a misspecified model of belief updating in response to preceding announcements.

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  • Dominitz, Jeff & Hung, Angela A., 2009. "Empirical models of discrete choice and belief updating in observational learning experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 94-109, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:69:y:2009:i:2:p:94-109
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    Cited by:

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    2. Anthony Ziegelmeyer & Christoph March & Sebastian Kr?gel, 2013. "Do We Follow Others When We Should? A Simple Test of Rational Expectations: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(6), pages 2633-2642, October.
    3. Sebastian Heidenreich & Verity Watson & Mandy Ryan & Euan Phimister, 2018. "Decision heuristic or preference? Attribute non‐attendance in discrete choice problems," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(1), pages 157-171, January.
    4. Penczynski, Stefan P., 2017. "The nature of social learning: Experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 148-165.
    5. Ralph Stinebrickner & Todd R. Stinebrickner, 2014. "A Major in Science? Initial Beliefs and Final Outcomes for College Major and Dropout," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(1), pages 426-472.
    6. Lejarraga, Tomás & Lucena, Abel & Rubí-Barceló, Antoni, 2020. "Beliefs estimated from choices in Proposer-Responder Games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 442-459.
    7. Todd Stinebrickner & Ralph Stinebrickner, 2012. "Learning about Academic Ability and the College Dropout Decision," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(4), pages 707-748.
    8. Paul J. Healy & John Conlon & Yeochang Yoon, 2016. "Information Cascades with Informative Ratings: An Experimental Test," Working Papers 16-05, Ohio State University, Department of Economics.
    9. Sebastian Berger & Christoph Feldhaus & Axel Ockenfels, 2018. "A shared identity promotes herding in an information cascade game," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(1), pages 63-72, July.
    10. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Wang, Stephanie W., 2009. "On eliciting beliefs in strategic games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 98-109, August.
    11. Georg Weizsacker, 2010. "Do We Follow Others When We Should? A Simple Test of Rational Expectations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2340-2360, December.
    12. Fahr, René & Irlenbusch, Bernd, 2011. "Who follows the crowd—Groups or individuals?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 200-209.
    13. Bogaçhan Çelen & Sen Geng & Huihui Li, 2018. "Belief Error and Non-Bayesian Social Learning: An Experimental Evidence," GRU Working Paper Series GRU_2018_022, City University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics and Finance, Global Research Unit.
    14. Lukas Meub & Till Proeger & Hendrik Hüning, 2017. "A comparison of endogenous and exogenous timing in a social learning experiment," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 12(1), pages 143-166, April.
    15. Duffy, John & Hopkins, Ed & Kornienko, Tatiana, 2021. "Lone wolf or herd animal? Information choice and learning from others," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    16. Koessler, Frédéric & Noussair, Charles & Ziegelmeyer, Anthony, 2012. "Information aggregation and belief elicitation in experimental parimutuel betting markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 195-208.

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