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Conditional Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Firms Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Gebhardt, Georg
Schmidt, Klaus M.
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When a young entrepreneurial firm matures, it is often necessary to replace the founding entrepreneur by a professional manager. This replacement decision can be affected by the private benefits of control enjoyed by the entrepreneur which gives rise to a conflict of interest between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. We show that a combination of convertible securities and contingent control rights can be used to resolve this conflict efficiently. This contractual arrangement is frequently observed in venture capital finance.
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
5758.
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Date of creation: Jul 2006Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5758Contact details of provider: Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801 Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
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Keywords: control rights ; convertible securities ; corporate finance ; venture capital ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Hellmann, Thomas, 2006.
"IPOs, acquisitions, and the use of convertible securities in venture capital ,"
Journal of Financial Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 649-679, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Berglof, Erik, 1994.
"A Control Theory of Venture Capital Finance ,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 247-67, October.
Klaus M. Schmidt, 2003.
"Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance ,"
Journal of Finance ,
American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1139-1166, 06.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Colin Mayer & Koen Schoors & Yishay Yafeh, 2003.
"Sources of Funds and Investment Activities of Venture Capital Funds: Evidence from Germany, Israel, Japan and the UK ,"
NBER Working Papers
9645, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Hannan, Michael T & Burton, M Diane & Baron, James N, 1996.
"Inertia and Change in the Early Years: Employment Relations in Young, High Technology Firms ,"
Industrial and Corporate Change ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 503-36.
Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, 2003.
"Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(2), pages 281-315, 04.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Kaplan, Steven & Strömberg, Per Johan, 2000.
"Financial Contracting Theory Meets The Real World: An Empirical Analysis Of Venture Capital Contracts ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2421, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, 2000.
"Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts ,"
NBER Working Papers
7660, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, 2000.
"Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts ,"
CRSP working papers
513, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
[Downloadable!] Rafael Repullo & Javier Suarez, 2004.
"Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach ,"
Review of Finance ,
Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 75-108.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Repullo, R. & Suarez, J., 1998.
"Venture Capital Finance: a Security Design Approach ,"
Papers
9804, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
Repullo, Rafael & Suarez, Javier, 1999.
"Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2097, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Thomas Hellmann, 1998.
"The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 57-76, Spring.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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