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Contracts for venture capital financing with double-sided moral hazard

Author

Listed:
  • Hui Fu

    (Jiangnan University)

  • Jun Yang

    (Acadia University)

  • Yunbi An

    (University of Windsor)

Abstract

Using a Nash bargaining approach, we analyze the financing contract between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist with double-sided moral hazard in a start-up enterprise. Our results show that there exists an optimal contract set between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist, in which all contracts achieve an identical second-best social state. Within the optimal contract set, there exists continuum of joint debt-equity financing. The pure equity financing contract exists in the optimal contract set when the ratio of total social surplus to the amount of investment is greater than a threshold.

Suggested Citation

  • Hui Fu & Jun Yang & Yunbi An, 2019. "Contracts for venture capital financing with double-sided moral hazard," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 129-144, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:sbusec:v:53:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s11187-018-0028-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s11187-018-0028-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal contract; Venture capital; Double-sided moral hazard; Bargaining game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship

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