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Horizontal mergers, entry, and efficiency defences

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  • Spector, David

Abstract

This paper addresses the effect of horizontal mergers on prices. It is shown that if firms compete in quantities and marginal costs are nondecreasing, any profitable merger failing to generate technological synergies must harm consumers through higher prices, irrespective of entry conditions in the industry. However this result does not hold if products are differentiated and firms compete in prices. The implications for merger policy are discussed.

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File URL: http://www.cepremap.fr/depot/couv_orange/co0206.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CEPREMAP in its series CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) with number 0206.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpm:cepmap:0206

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  1. Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro., 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Economics Working Papers, University of California at Berkeley 8880, University of California at Berkeley.
  2. Dixit, Avinash K, 1986. "Comparative Statics for Oligopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(1), pages 107-22, February.
  3. Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 473-486, Winter.
  4. Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, 2001. "Scale Economies and Synergies in Horizontal Merger Analysis," Industrial Organization, EconWPA 0012002, EconWPA, revised 05 Jan 2001.
  5. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
  6. Seade, Jesus, 1980. "The stability of cournot revisited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 15-27, August.
  7. Hay, George A & Werden, Gregory J, 1993. "Horizontal Mergers: Law, Policy, and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 173-77, May.
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