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Trade fragmentation and coordination in bilateral oligopolies

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  • BLOCH, Francis

    (IRES, Department of Economics, Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), 1348 Louvain la Neuve, Belgium)

  • FERRER, Hélène

    (IRES, Department of Economics, Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), 1348 Louvain la Neuve, Belgium)

Abstract

This paper studies a strategic market game where agents fragment their bids on different markets. Simple conditions for existence of an interior equilibrium point are provided. In equilibrium, all agents are active on the same markets and prices are identical across markets, so that all equilibria are equivalent to an equilibrium where all agents trade on a single market.

Suggested Citation

  • BLOCH, Francis & FERRER, Hélène, 1999. "Trade fragmentation and coordination in bilateral oligopolies," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1999008, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1999008
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    File URL: https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp1999.html
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bloch, Francis & Ghosal, Sayantan, 1997. "Stable Trading Structures in Bilateral Oligopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 368-384, June.
    2. B. C. Eaton & Richard G. Harris (ed.), 1997. "Trade, Technology and Economics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1020.
    3. Martin Shubik, 1977. "A Theory of Money and Financial Institutions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 462, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. GABSZEWICZ, Jean & MICHEL, Philippe, 1992. "Oligopoly equilibria in exchange economies," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1992047, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1977. "Trade Using One Commodity as a Means of Payment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(5), pages 937-968, October.
    6. Amir, Rabah & Sahi, Siddharta & Shubik, Martin & Yao, Shuntian, 1990. "A strategic market game with complete markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 126-143, June.
    7. Cordella, Tito & Gabszewicz, Jean J., 1998. ""Nice" Trivial Equilibria in Strategic Market Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 162-169, January.
    8. Dubey, Pradeep & Shubik, Martin, 1978. "A theory of money and financial institutions. 28. The non-cooperative equilibria of a closed trading economy with market supply and bidding strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-20, February.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Koutsougeras, Leonidas C., 2003. "Convergence to no arbitrage equilibria in market games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(5-6), pages 401-420, July.
    3. Carlo Carraro, 2006. "Incentives and Institutions. A Bottom-up Approach to Climate Policy," Working Papers 2006_49, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".

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