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Taxing market power

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  • GABSZEWICZ, Jean J.
  • GRAZZINI, Lisa

Abstract

We investigate the effectiveness of tax and transfer policies in correcting market distortions when the economy is imperfectly competitive. We perform this analysis in the context of an exchange model representing bilateral oligopoly situations, which constitute particular examples of Shapley–Shubik strategic market games.
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Suggested Citation

  • GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & GRAZZINI, Lisa, 1999. "Taxing market power," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1422, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1422
    DOI: 10.1111/1097-3923.00022
    Note: In : Journal of Public Economic Theory, 1(4), 475-497, 1999
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bloch, Francis & Ghosal, Sayantan, 1997. "Stable Trading Structures in Bilateral Oligopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 368-384, June.
    2. B. C. Eaton & Richard G. Harris (ed.), 1997. "Trade, Technology and Economics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1020.
    3. Myles, Gareth D., 1989. "Ramsey tax rules for economies with imperfect competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 95-115, February.
    4. GABSZEWICZ, Jean & MICHEL, Philippe, 1992. "Oligopoly equilibria in exchange economies," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1992047, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1977. "Trade Using One Commodity as a Means of Payment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(5), pages 937-968, October.
    6. Aumann, Robert J & Kurz, Mordecai, 1977. "Power and Taxes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(5), pages 1137-1161, July.
    7. Gale, David, 1974. "Exchange equilibrium and coalitions : An example," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 63-66, March.
    8. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    9. Cordella, Tito & Gabszewicz, Jean J., 1998. ""Nice" Trivial Equilibria in Strategic Market Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 162-169, January.
    10. Dubey, Pradeep & Shubik, Martin, 1978. "A theory of money and financial institutions. 28. The non-cooperative equilibria of a closed trading economy with market supply and bidding strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-20, February.
    11. Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1978. "Taxing price makers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 423-455, December.
    12. Aumann, Robert J., 1973. "Disadvantageous monopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 1-11, February.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bertrand Crettez & Pierre-André Jouvet & Ludovic A. Julien, 2014. "Tax Policy in a Simple General Oligopoly Equilibrium Model with Pollution Permits," Working Papers 1413, Chaire Economie du climat.
    2. GRAZZINI, Lisa, 2000. "Ad valorem and per unit taxation in an oligopoly model," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2000054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Cyrinus B. Elegbede & Ludovic A. Julien & Louis Mesnard, 2022. "On preferences and taxation mechanisms in strategic bilateral exchange," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(1), pages 43-73, March.
    4. Julien, Ludovic A., 2011. "Unemployment equilibrium and economic policy in mixed markets," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 1931-1940, July.
    5. Leonidas C. Koutsougeras & Nicholas Ziros, 2015. "The Second Welfare Theorem in Economies with Non-Walrasian Markets," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(3), pages 415-432, June.
    6. Ludovic A. Julien & Anicet Kabre & Louis de Mesnard, 2022. "Pollution in strategic multilateral exchange: taxing emissions or trading on permit markets?," Post-Print hal-03791673, HAL.
    7. A. Dickson & R. Hartley, 2005. "The strategic Marshallian cross and bilateral oligopoly," Economics Discussion Paper Series 0523, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    8. Toraubally, Waseem A., 2018. "Large market games, the law of one price, and market structure," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 13-26.
    9. Ascari, Guido & Bertoletti, Paolo & Menegatti, Mario, 2005. "Taxing a monopolist," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(4), pages 321-334, December.
    10. Lasserre, Pierre & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2003. "A Ricardian model of the tragedy of the commons," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 29-45, January.
    11. GABSZEWICZ, Jean & GRAZZINI, Lisa, 2000. "Strategic multilateral exchange and taxes," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2000063, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    12. Julien, Ludovic A., 2009. "Conjectural variations, symmetric equilibria and economic policy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 1115-1120, September.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies

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