Alex Dickson () (Keele University, Centre for Economic Research and School of Economic and Management Studies) Roger Hartley (Department of Economics, University of Manchester)
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We prove existence and uniqueness of non-autarkic equilibria in bilateral oligopoly assuming only that preferences are binormal and satisfy a weakened version of gross substitutes. We permit complete heterogeneity of preferences and our analysis exploits the fact that payoffs depend only on own strategy and two universal aggregates. This allows us to define strategic versions of supply and demand curves such that non-autarkic Nash equilibria are in 1-1 correspondence with intersections of these curves. The same approach can be used to establish comparative statics under the assumptions above. As examples, we focus on adding players and changing endowments. This competitive approach also allows us to conclude that much of conventional Marshallian analysis is robust to strategic manipulation.
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Paper provided by Centre for Economic Research, Keele University in its series Keele Economics Research Papers with number
KERP 2007/13.
Length: 28 pages Date of creation: Oct 2007 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:kee:kerpuk:2007/13
Note: This is the revised version of an earlier paper, first circulated as Keele Economics Research Paper 04/07 and University of Manchester Economics Discussion Paper 0523, under different titles. Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, University of Keele, Keele, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG - United Kingdom Phone: +44 (0)1782 584581 Fax: +44 (0)1782 717577 Email: Web page: http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/ec/cer/ More information through EDIRC
Order Information: Postal: Centre for Economic Research, Research Institute for Public Policy and Management, Keele University, Staffordshire ST5 5BG - United Kingdom Email: Web: http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/ec/cer/pubs_kerps.htm
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
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