Volunteer work and club size: Nash equilibrium and optimality
AbstractThe non-cooperative provision of public goods is analysed in the context of a two-stage game in which club size is determined endogenously. Equilibrium club size and voluntary labour supply are shown to be inefficient. The impact of optimally-chosen fiscal policies using simple instruments is studied. When agents do not derive nonpecuniary benefits from volunteer work, lump-sum grants can be used to implement the first-best equal treatment allocation but private provision is fully crowded out. Otherwise, it is found that simple fiscal instruments cannot implement the first-best equal-treatment allocation unless club size is directly regulated.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1992040.
Date of creation: 01 Jun 1992
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Other versions of this item:
- Barham, Vicky & Boadway, Robin & Marchand, Maurice & Pestieau, Pierre, 1997. "Volunteer work and club size: Nash equilibrium and optimality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 9-22, July.
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