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Retional Nonprofit Entrepreneurship

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Author Info

  • Bilodeau, M.
  • Slivinski, A.

Abstract

This paper derives the decision to found a nonprofit firm as the equilibrium outcome of a multistage game among individuals who would like a public good to be provided. The model predicts that if individuals will voluntarily contribute towards provision of the public good, then it is in the private interest of the entrepreneur to impose a non-distribution constraint on herself by founding a nonprofit firm. This decision also results in greater voluntary contributions than if the firm is proprietary.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics in its series UWO Department of Economics Working Papers with number 9709.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uwo:uwowop:9709

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Reference Centre, Social Science Centre, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 5C2
Phone: 519-661-2111 Ext.85244
Web page: http://economics.uwo.ca/research/research_papers/department_working_papers.html

Related research

Keywords: DECISION MAKING; ENTREPRENEURSHIP;

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References

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  1. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
  2. Sugden, Robert, 1982. "On the Economics of Philanthropy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 92(366), pages 341-50, June.
  3. Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1987. "Ideals versus Dollars: Donors, Charity Managers, and Government Grants," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(4), pages 810-23, August.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Paul Makdissi & Cyril Téjédo, 2000. "Problèmes d’appariement et politique de l’emploi," Cahiers de recherche 00-04, Departement d'Economique de la Faculte d'administration à l'Universite de Sherbrooke.
  2. John Baldwin & Petr Hanel & David Sabourin, 2000. "Les déterminants des activités d’innovation dans les entreprises de fabrication canadiennes : le rôle des droits de propriété intellectuelle," Cahiers de recherche Statistique Canada No 11F, Departement d'Economique de la Faculte d'administration à l'Universite de Sherbrooke.
  3. Ghatak, Maitreesh & Mueller, Hannes Felix, 2010. "Thanks for Nothing? Not-for-Profits and Motivated Agents," CEPR Discussion Papers 7663, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Vesterlund, Lise, 2003. "The informational value of sequential fundraising," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 627-657, March.
  5. Petra Brhlikova & Andeas Ortmann, 2006. "The Impact of the Non-distribution Constraint and Its Enforcement on Entrepreneurial Choice, Price, and Quality," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp299, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  6. Al Slivinski, 1999. "Team Incentives and Organizational Form," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9916, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  7. Ballou, Jeffrey P. & Weisbrod, Burton A., 2003. "Managerial rewards and the behavior of for-profit, governmental, and nonprofit organizations: evidence from the hospital industry," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 1895-1920, September.
  8. Bilodeau, Marc & Slivinski, Al, 1997. "Rival charities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 449-467, December.
  9. Christoph Starke & Steffen Burchhardt, 2014. "Revealing the Preferences of Social Financiers," FEMM Working Papers 140002, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
  10. Edward Nissan & Maria-Soledad Castaño & Inmaculada Carrasco, 2012. "Drivers of non-profit activity: a cross-country analysis," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 303-320, April.

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