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Toilet Cleaning and Department Chairing: Volunteering a Public service

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Author Info
Marc Bilodeau (Dept d'Economique, U de Sherbrooke)
Al Slivinski (Dept of Economics, U of Western Ontario)

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Abstract

Who will do a job that nobody wants but that someone has to do? The search for a volunteer is modelled as a war of attrition in which everyone is tempted to just wait for someone else to do it. We show that the volunteer will be, ceteris paribus, the individual for whom the benefit/cost ratio of performing the public service is the largest, the one most impatient to consume it, or the one who stands to benefit from it the longest.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 9405001.

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Length: 8 pages
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:9405001

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
H - Public Economics

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  1. David P. Myatt, 2005. "Instant Exit from the Asymmetric War of Attrition," Economics Series Working Papers 160, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Matthias Messner & Mattias Polborn, 2003. "Paying Politicians," Working Papers 246, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Panu Poutvaara & Tuomas Takalo, 2004. "Candidate Quality," Public Economics 0406009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Rida Laraki & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2003. "Continuous-time Games of Timing," Discussion Papers 1363, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Bitzer, Jürgen & Schrettl, Wolfram & Schröder, Philipp J.H., 2006. "Intrinsic Motivation versus Signaling in Open Source Software Development," Working Papers 06-7, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Petr Hanel, 2003. "Impact Of Government Support Programs On Innovation By Canadian Manufacturing Firms," Cahiers de recherche 04-02, Departement d'Economique de la Faculte d'administration à l'Universite de Sherbrooke. [Downloadable!]
  7. Barla, P. & Pestieau, P., 2005. "The Optimal Number of Charities," Cahiers de recherche 0501, GREEN. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Oliver Kirchkamp,, 2006. "Less fighting than expected — experiments with wars of attrition and all-pay auctions," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 0607, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Pene Kalulumia, 2002. "Effects of government debt on interest rates: evidence from causality tests in johansen-type models," Cahiers de recherche 02-07, Departement d'Economique de la Faculte d'administration à l'Universite de Sherbrooke. [Downloadable!]
  10. Xiaopeng Xu, 2002. "Threshold levels and the realization of a group benefit," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(16), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
  11. Daniel Goulao, 2005. "Review of Privade Provided Public Goods Literature," Public Economics 0501006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  12. Peter Burton, 2004. "Hugging Trees: Claiming de Facto Property Rights by Blockading Resource Use," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 27(2), pages 135-163, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. repec:att:wimass:1920213 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Pene Kalulumia & Denis Bolduc, 2004. "Generalized Mixed Estimation Of A Multinomial Discretecontinuous Choice Model For Electricity Demand," Cahiers de recherche 04-01, Departement d'Economique de la Faculte d'administration à l'Universite de Sherbrooke. [Downloadable!]
  15. Markku Stenborg, 2003. "Waiting for F/OSS: Coordinating the Production of Free/Open Source Software," Discussion Papers 884, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
  16. Stephan Kroll & Todd Cherry & Jason Shogren, 2007. "The impact of endowment heterogeneity and origin on contributions in best-shot public good games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 411-428, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Jürgen Bitzer & Philipp J. H. Schröder, 2002. "Bug-Fixing and Code-Writing: The Private Provision of Open Source Software," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 296, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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