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Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions

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Ehud Guttel
Barak Medina
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 122247000000001799.

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Date of creation: 18 Dec 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001799

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  1. Fajnzylber, Pablo & Lederman, Daniel & Loayza, Norman, 2002. "Inequality and Violent Crime," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 1-40, April.
  2. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Luciano Andreozzi, 2004. "Rewarding Policemen Increases Crime. Another Surprising Result from the Inspection Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 69-82, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Wittman, Donald, 1993. "Nash equilibrium vs. maximin : A comparative game statics analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 559-565, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Dhammika Dharmapala & Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "Penalty Enhancement for Hate Crimes: An Economic Analysis," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 185-207.
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  6. Li Gan & Roberton C. Williams III & Thomas Wiseman, 2004. "A Simple Model of Optimal Hate Crime Legislation," NBER Working Papers 10463, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Steven G. Craig & Eric J. Heikkila, 1989. "Urban Safety in Vancouver: Allocation and Production of a Congestible Public Good," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(4), pages 867-84, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Binmore, Ken & Swierzbinski, Joe & Proulx, Chris, 2001. "Does Minimax Work? An Experimental Study," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(473), pages 445-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Pierre Thomas Léger, 2000. "Quality control mechanisms under capitation payment for medical services," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(2), pages 564-586, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Reilly, Barry & Witt, Robert, 1996. "Crime, Deterrence and Unemployment in England and Wales: An Empirical Analysis," Bulletin of Economic Research, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(2), pages 137-59, April.
  11. Lando, Henrik & Shavell, Steven, 2004. "The advantage of focusing law enforcement effort," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 209-218, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Tao, Hung-Lin, 2004. "Property crime distribution and equal police deployment--an empirical study of Taiwan," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 165-178, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. " The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(3), pages 267-95, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, Ivan, 1989. "Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 399-415, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Behrman, Jere R & Craig, Steven G, 1987. "The Distribution of Public Services: An Exploration of Local Governmental Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 37-49, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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