Urban Safety in Vancouver: Allocation and Production of a Congestible Public Good
AbstractThis paper is a simultaneous exploration of the within-city production of safety with the endogenous allocation of public inputs (police). Three issues are central. One is an examination of the local government allocation function. Second is that safety is specified as a congestible public service consistent with club theory. Finally, the model is estimated using a survey measure of crime. These innovations are due to a unique data set containing observations by neighborhoods in the city of Vancouver. The results are crucial for illustrating crime deterrence, as well as the local public good nature of safety.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 22 (1989)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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- Ajwad, Mohamed Ihsan, 2006. "Is intrajurisdictional resource allocation equitable?: An analysis of campus-level spending data for Texas elementary schools," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 552-564, September.
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