Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Quality control mechanisms under capitation payment for medical services

Contents:

Author Info

  • Pierre Thomas Léger

Abstract

As a result of rising health care costs, many countries, including the United States, have turned to managed care organizations and the use of capitation payment systems. Although this type of system is an effective mechanism for reducing excessive utilization of health care, it may lead to the underprovision of medical services. In this paper propensity to underprovide medical services in a prepayment system as well as the effects of auditing/monitoring on physician behaviour and patient well-being are examined. Conditions are found under which managed care yields more efficient outcomes than traditional fee-for-service care.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://economics.ca/cgi/xms?jab=v33n2/13.pdf
File Function: Full text
Download Restriction: Available to subscribers only. Alternative access through JSTOR and Ingenta.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 33 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 564-586

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:33:y:2000:i:2:p:564-586

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
Email:
Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://economics.ca/en/membership.php

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Åke Blomqvist & Pierre Thomas Léger, 2002. "Information Asymmetry, Insurance, and the Decision to Hospitalize," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-06, CIRANO.
  2. Ehud Guttel & Barak Medina, 2007. "Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001799, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Eugenia Amporfu, 2013. "Effect of regulated user fee on quality of healthcare for the poor and the non-poor," International Review of Economics, Springer, vol. 60(4), pages 357-373, December.
  4. Ehud Guttel & Barak Medina, 2007. "Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions," Discussion Paper Series dp472, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:33:y:2000:i:2:p:564-586. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.