Quality control mechanisms under capitation payment for medical services
AbstractAs a result of rising health care costs, many countries, including the United States, have turned to managed care organizations and the use of capitation payment systems. Although this type of system is an effective mechanism for reducing excessive utilization of health care, it may lead to the underprovision of medical services. In this paper propensity to underprovide medical services in a prepayment system as well as the effects of auditing/monitoring on physician behaviour and patient well-being are examined. Conditions are found under which managed care yields more efficient outcomes than traditional fee-for-service care.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 33 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Eugenia Amporfu, 2013. "Effect of regulated user fee on quality of healthcare for the poor and the non-poor," International Review of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 60(4), pages 357-373, December.
- Ã…ke Blomqvist & Pierre Thomas LÃ©ger, 2001.
"Information Asymmetry, Insurance, and the Decision to Hospitalize,"
Cahiers de recherche
01-03, HEC MontrÃ©al, Institut d'Ã©conomie appliquÃ©e.
- Blomqvist, Ake & Leger, Pierre Thomas, 2005. "Information asymmetry, insurance, and the decision to hospitalize," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 775-793, July.
- Ã…ke Blomqvist & Pierre Thomas LÃ©ger, 2003. "Information Asymmetry, Insurance, and the Decision to Hospitalize," Departmental Working Papers, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics wp0305, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics.
- Ã…ke Blomqvist & Pierre Thomas LÃ©ger, 2002. "Information Asymmetry, Insurance, and the Decision to Hospitalize," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO 2002s-06, CIRANO.
- Ehud Guttel & Barak Medina, 2007. "Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001799, UCLA Department of Economics.
- R. Amy Puenpatom & Robert Rosenman, 2006. "Efficiency of Thai provincial public hospitals after the introduction of National Health Insurance Program," Working Papers, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University 2006-2, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
- Ehud Guttel & Barak Medina, 2007. "Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions," Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem dp472, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.