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Entry coordination in auctions and social welfare: An experimental investigation

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Author Info

  • Dan Levin

    (Department of Economics, Ohio State University, 410 Arps Hall, 1945 North High Street, Columbus, OH 43210-1172 Revised February 2000)

  • James L. Smith

    ()
    (Department of Finance, 440 Fincher Building, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275-0333)

Abstract

Most of the literature on auctions with endogenous entry assumes that, in equilibrium, the number of entrants is deterministic. We discuss a series of experiments designed to test the alternative hypothesis that, even in equilibrium, the number of entrants is stochastic. This distinction has strong implications for auction performance, the design of optimal mechanisms, and social welfare. Our results strongly reject the hypothesis of deterministic entry and tend to confirm the alternative hypothesis that entry is stochastic.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 30 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 321-350

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2002:i:3:p:321-350

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Related research

Keywords: Auctions · Entry · Experiments · Coordination;

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Cited by:
  1. Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Salmon, Timothy C., 2010. "The High/Low Divide: Self- Selection by Values in Auction Choice," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 295, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  2. Ehud Guttel & Barak Medina, 2007. "Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001799, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Chakravarty, Surajeet & Ghosh, Sudeep, 2011. "An experimental investigation of entry cost effects in sealed-bid dollar auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 122-124, May.
  4. Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Salmon, Timothy C., 2008. "Revenue equivalence revisited," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 171-192, September.
  5. Ehud Guttel & Barak Medina, 2007. "Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions," Discussion Paper Series dp472, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

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