This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Entry coordination in auctions and social welfare: An experimental investigation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Dan Levin (Department of Economics, Ohio State University, 410 Arps Hall, 1945 North High Street, Columbus, OH 43210-1172 Revised February 2000)
James L. Smith () (Department of Finance, 440 Fincher Building, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275-0333)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Most of the literature on auctions with endogenous entry assumes that, in equilibrium, the number of entrants is deterministic. We discuss a series of experiments designed to test the alternative hypothesis that, even in equilibrium, the number of entrants is stochastic. This distinction has strong implications for auction performance, the design of optimal mechanisms, and social welfare. Our results strongly reject the hypothesis of deterministic entry and tend to confirm the alternative hypothesis that entry is stochastic.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/papers/2030003/20300321.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 30 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 321-350
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2002:i:3:p:321-350

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm

Order Information:
Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F Baum).

Related research
Keywords: Auctions · Entry · Experiments · Coordination;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Lixin Ye, 2004. "Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc data is maintained by each archive holder on its own website. Nothing is held centrally.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-22.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.