An Experiment on Protecting Intellectual Property
AbstractWe conduct a laboratory experiment to explore whether the protection of intellectual property (IP) incentivizes people to create non-rivalrous knowledge goods, foregoing the production of other rivalrous goods. In the contrasting treatment with no IP protection, participants are free to resell and remake non-rivalrous knowledge goods originally created by others. We find that creators reap substantial profits when IP is protected and that rampant pirating is not uncommon when there is no IP protection. But most importantly, we find that IP protection in and of itself is neither necessary nor sufficient for generating wealth from the discovery of knowledge goods.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Chapman University, Economic Science Institute in its series Working Papers with number 12-09.
Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
intellectual property; experimental economics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other
- K39 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Other
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2012-05-02 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-INO-2012-05-02 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2012-05-02 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-KNM-2012-05-02 (Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Boldrin,Michele & Levine,David K., 2008.
"Against Intellectual Monopoly,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521879286.
- Bettina Klose & Dan Kovenock, 2012.
"Extremism Drives Out Moderation,"
12-10, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
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