Insiders, outsiders, and the adaptability of informal rules to ecological shocks
AbstractThe history of the world is strewn with the remains of societies whose institutions failed to adapt to ecological change, but the determinants of institutional fragility are difficult to identify in the historical record. We report a laboratory experiment exploring the impact of an exogenous ecological shock on the informal rules of property and exchange. We find that geographically-induced tribal sentiments, which are unobservable in the historical record, impede adaptation post shock and that inequality declines as wealth and sociableness increase. Quantitative measures of individual and group sociality account for some of the differences in successful or failed adaptation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Ecological Economics.
Volume (Year): 90 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon
Experimental economics; Rules; Ecological shocks;
Other versions of this item:
- Erik O. Kimbrough & Bart J. Wilson, 2012. "Insiders, outsiders, and the adaptability of informal rules to ecological shocks," Discussion Papers dp12-20, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
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