Subsidizing National Champions: An Evolutionary Perspective
AbstractA national-champions-related industrial policy has become (again) en vogue among European politicians. Against this background, our work orders different types of national champions along the industry lifecycle. Different types of locally bound externalities appear along the lifecycle. In a simple model, we show that it may be efficient to subsidize innovative firms in their early stages or to protect mature firms from competition to appropriate these externalities. However, non-benevolent politicians may not choose efficient policies. Real-world examples indicate that politicians tend to concentrate on externalities at the mature stage of the lifecycle. These externalities may be transitory or at the expense of foreign country consumers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 2380.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
national champions; industrial policy; industry lifecycle; externalities;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
- O25 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Industrial Policy
- O33 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
- P11 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
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