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Abstract

We extend a model of wasteful state aid in Dewatripont and Seabright (2006, Journal of the European Economic Association 4, 513–522) by a supranational controlling authority. The model combines moral hazard and adverse selection to show that politicians fund wasteful projects to signal their effort. Voters, unable to observe project benefits or effort, reward funding with a reelection premium that separates a high-effort politician from a low-effort politician. We examine state aid control by a benevolent authority which receives extra signals about the state of the world. We find that signals on the politician type are worthless. For signals on the project type, we derive a sufficient condition for aid control to unambiguously decrease welfare. We also prove that politicians do not respond to marginal changes in incentives. In this setup, the optimal state aid control is fairly often no control.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies in its journal AUCO Czech Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 3 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 093-113

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Handle: RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2009_093

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Related research

Keywords: State aid; signaling; career concerns; aid control;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
• D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies

References

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1. Mathias Dewatripont & Paul Seabright, 2006. ""Wasteful" Public Spending and State Aid Control," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(2-3), pages 513-522, 04-05.
   
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   • Mathias Dewatripont & Paul Seabright, 2006. "Wasteful public spending and state aid control," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9635, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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13. Karen Helene Midelfart-Knarvik & Henry G. Overman, 2002. "Delocation and European integration: is structural spending justified?," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 17(35), pages 321-359, October.
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