Continuous Time and Communication in a Public-goods Experiment
AbstractWe investigate the nature of continuous-time strategic interactions in public-goodsgames. In one set of treatments, four subjects make contribution decisions in continuous timewhile in another they make them only at discrete points of time. The effect of continuous timeis muted in public-goods games compared to simpler social dilemmas; the data suggest thatwidespread coordination problems are to blame. With a rich communication protocol, thesecoordination problems disappear and the median subject contributes fully to the public good,with no time decay. At the median, the same communication protocol is less than half aseffective in discrete time.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara in its series University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series with number qt5404914p.
Date of creation: 04 Apr 2012
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Social and Behavioral Sciences; public goods; voluntary contribution mechanism; continuous-time games;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2012-09-30 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2012-09-30 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-09-30 (Game Theory)
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- Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness & Matthew Ellman, 2012.
"Let's talk: How communication affects contract design,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
908.12, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness & Matthew Ellman, 2012. "Let's Talk: How Communication Affects Contract Design," Working Papers 648, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness & Matthew Ellman, 2012. "Let's Talk: How Communication Affects Contract Design," CESifo Working Paper Series 3883, CESifo Group Munich.
- Charness, Gary & Brandts, Jordi & Ellman, Matthew, 2012. "Letâ€™s talk: How communication affects contract design," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt6z24s6rv, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
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