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Vertical integration in Mexican community forestry

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  • Antinori, Camille M.
  • Rausser, Gordon C.

Abstract

While research has revealed the role of common property in risk diversification, poverty alleviation and resource management, few studies identify how common property management systems fill that role uniquely where market mechanisms or private property rights fail. To address that gap, the present research develops a consistent framework for analyzing local level production where community organizations have vertically integrated into the wood products industry, using common property forest as a source of raw material. Based on an incomplete contracting approach, it is argued that vertical integration allows local stakeholders to guide development within their community, provided that marginal productivity attains a certain level. Empirical results using a survey of 44 community governance regimes in Oaxaca, Mexico, show that communities are more likely to integrate forward into timber processing activities when they achieve initial levels of human and and social capital and increase labor productivity through higher forest land endowments. The model is extended to demonstrate that economies of scope arise between community-level timber production and non-timber benefits.

Suggested Citation

  • Antinori, Camille M. & Rausser, Gordon C., 2000. "Vertical integration in Mexican community forestry," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt7kd903jn, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
  • Handle: RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt7kd903jn
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jeffrey B. Nugent & Nicolas Sanchez, 1998. "Common Property Rights as an Endogenous Response to Risk," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 80(3), pages 651-657.
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    Cited by:

    1. Antinori, Camille & Rausser, Gordon C., 2003. "Does Community Involvement Matter? How Collective Choice Affects Forests in Mexico," CUDARE Working Papers 25076, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.

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