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Auditing the Auditors: Tax Auditors' Assessments and Incentives

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  • Ken Klassen

    (University of Waterloo)

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  • Ken Klassen, 2016. "Auditing the Auditors: Tax Auditors' Assessments and Incentives," e-briefs 234, C.D. Howe Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdh:ebrief:234
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Crocker, Keith J. & Slemrod, Joel, 2005. "Corporate tax evasion with agency costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1593-1610, September.
    2. Auerbach,Alan J. & Hines, Jr.,James R. & Slemrod,Joel (ed.), 2007. "Taxing Corporate Income in the 21st Century," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521870221.
    3. Kong-Pin & C.Y. Cyrus Chu, 2005. "Internal Control versus External Manipulation: A Model of Corporate Income Tax Evasion," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(1), pages 151-164, Spring.
    4. Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June.
    5. William Joseph Crandall, 2010. "Revenue Administration; Performance Measurement in Tax Administration," IMF Technical Notes and Manuals 10/11, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Brian Erard & Jonathan S. Feinstein, 1994. "Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
    7. Kenneth J. Klassen & Stacie Kelley Laplante, 2012. "The Effect of Foreign Reinvestment and Financial Reporting Incentives on Cross†Jurisdictional Income Shifting," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 29(3), pages 928-955, September.
    8. Kong-Pin Chen & C.Y. Cyrus Chu, 2005. "Internal Control vs. External Manipulation: A Model of Corporate Income Tax Evasion," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(4), pages 151-164, Winter.
    9. William Joseph Crandall, 2010. "Revenue Administration: Performance Measurement in Tax Administration," IMF Technical Notes and Manuals 2010/011, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1986. "Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(3), pages 739-760, October.
    11. Johannes Becker & Clemens Fuest, 2010. "Tax enforcement and tax havens under formula apportionment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 17(3), pages 217-235, June.
    12. Gibbs, Michael, 1995. "Incentive compensation in a corporate hierarchy," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2-3), pages 247-277, April.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal and Tax Policy;

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H39 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Other

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