Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Labor unions and tax aggressiveness

Contents:

Author Info

  • Chyz, James A.
  • Ching Leung, Winnie Siu
  • Zhen Li, Oliver
  • Meng Rui, Oliver

Abstract

We examine the impact of unionization on firms' tax aggressiveness. We find a negative association between firms' tax aggressiveness and union power and a decrease in tax aggressiveness after labor union election wins. This relation is consistent with labor unions influencing managers' in one, or both, of two ways: (1) constraining managers' ability to invest in tax aggressiveness through increased monitoring; or (2) decreasing returns to tax aggressiveness that arise from unions' rent seeking behavior. We also find preliminary evidence that the market expects these reductions around union elections and discounts firms that likely add shareholder value via aggressive tax strategies.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X13000299
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Economics.

Volume (Year): 108 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 675-698

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:108:y:2013:i:3:p:675-698

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576

Related research

Keywords: Labor union; Tax aggressiveness;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. John R. Graham & Mark H. Lang & Douglas A. Shackelford, 2002. "Employee Stock Options, Corporate Taxes and Debt Policy," NBER Working Papers 9289, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Desai, Mihir A. & Dyck, Alexander & Zingales, Luigi, 2007. "Theft and taxes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 591-623, June.
  3. Connolly, Robert A & Hirsch, Barry T & Hirschey, Mark, 1986. "Union Rent Seeking, Intangible Capital, and Market Value of the Firm," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 68(4), pages 567-77, November.
  4. Mitchell A. Petersen, 2009. "Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(1), pages 435-480, January.
  5. Olubunmi Faleye & Vikas Mehrotra & Randall Morck, 2005. "When Labor Has a Voice in Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 11254, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. David A. Matsa, 2010. "Capital Structure as a Strategic Variable: Evidence from Collective Bargaining," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(3), pages 1197-1232, 06.
  7. Rafael Gomez & Konstantinos Tzioumis, 2006. "What do unions do to executive compensation?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19865, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  8. Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, 2005. "Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value," NBER Working Papers 11241, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Mihir Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, . "Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings, American Law & Economics Association 1006, American Law & Economics Association.
  10. Merton, Robert C, 1974. "On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 29(2), pages 449-70, May.
  11. Gaspar, Jose-Miguel & Massa, Massimo & Matos, Pedro, 2005. "Shareholder investment horizons and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 135-165, April.
  12. Kaplan, Steven N & Zingales, Luigi, 1997. "Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 169-215, February.
  13. Chen, Huafeng Jason & Kacperczyk, Marcin & Ortiz-Molina, Hernán, 2011. "Labor Unions, Operating Flexibility, and the Cost of Equity," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(01), pages 25-58, March.
  14. Shackelford, Douglas A. & Shevlin, Terry, 2001. "Empirical tax research in accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-3), pages 321-387, September.
  15. Klasa, Sandy & Maxwell, William F. & Ortiz-Molina, Hernán, 2009. "The strategic use of corporate cash holdings in collective bargaining with labor unions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 421-442, June.
  16. Bronars, Stephen G & Deere, Donald R, 1991. "The Threat of Unionization, the Use of Debt, and the Preservation of Shareholder Wealth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 106(1), pages 231-54, February.
  17. Crocker, Keith J. & Slemrod, Joel, 2005. "Corporate tax evasion with agency costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1593-1610, September.
  18. Kong-Pin Chen & C.Y. Cyrus Chu, 2005. "Internal Control vs. External Manipulation: A Model of Corporate Income Tax Evasion," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(4), pages 151-164, Winter.
  19. Ruback, Richard S & Zimmerman, Martin B, 1984. "Unionization and Profitability: Evidence from the Capital Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 1134-57, December.
  20. Andrew K. Prevost & Ramesh P. Rao & Melissa A. Williams, 2012. "Labor Unions as Shareholder Activists: Champions or Detractors?," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 47(2), pages 327-349, 05.
  21. Graham, John R. & Tucker, Alan L., 2006. "Tax shelters and corporate debt policy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 563-594, September.
  22. Joel Slemrod, 2004. "The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness," NBER Working Papers 10858, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. Chen, Shuping & Chen, Xia & Cheng, Qiang & Shevlin, Terry, 2010. "Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 41-61, January.
  24. Hanlon, Michelle & Heitzman, Shane, 2010. "A review of tax research," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 127-178, December.
  25. Sonja Olhoft Rego & Ryan Wilson, 2012. "Equity Risk Incentives and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 775-810, 06.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Hasan, Iftekhar & Hoi, Chun-Keung (Stan) & Wu, Qiang & Zhang, Hao, 2014. "Beauty is in the eye of the beholder: The effect of corporate tax avoidance on the cost of bank loans," Research Discussion Papers 3/2014, Bank of Finland.
  2. Chyz, James A., 2013. "Personally tax aggressive executives and corporate tax sheltering," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 311-328.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:108:y:2013:i:3:p:675-698. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.