Corporate Governance, Incentives, and Tax Avoidance
AbstractThis paper examines the link between corporate governance, managerial incentives, and tax avoidance. Similar to other investment opportunities, unresolved agency problems may cause managers to over- or under-invest in tax avoidance relative to the preferences of shareholders. Using quantile regression, we find that the impact of corporate governance on tax avoidance is most pronounced in the upper and lower tails of the tax avoidance distribution, but not at the mean or median of this distribution. Specifically, we find a positive relation between the financial sophistication and independence of boards and tax avoidance in the upper tail of the tax avoidance distribution, but a negative relation in the lower tail of the tax avoidance distribution. However, we find no relation between corporate governance and tax avoidance and either the conditional mean or median of the tax avoidance distribution. These results suggest that corporate governance tends to decrease extremely high levels of tax avoidance and increase extremely low levels of tax avoidance, which may be symptomatic of over- and under-investment, respectively, by managers. Our results also suggest that inferences about these relations that are drawn from the conditional mean and median and unlikely to be representative across the entire tax avoidance distribution.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stanford University, Graduate School of Business in its series Research Papers with number 2134.
Date of creation: Apr 2013
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Postal: Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015
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Web page: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
- K34 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Tax Law
- M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Accounting - - - Accounting
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-10-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CFN-2013-10-18 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-IUE-2013-10-18 (Informal & Underground Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2013-10-18 (Public Economics)
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