Corporate tax evasion: The case for specialists
AbstractWe analyze the role of accounting specialists who help corporations evade/avoid taxes in a game of incomplete information played by a tax authority, corporate taxpayers, and an accounting specialist. In addition to a full equilibrium characterization, we establish that (i) marginal changes in enforcement are not effective when evasion/avoidance is pervasive; (ii) fines on firms as opposed to specialists are more effective in such situations; (iii) reducing auditing costs and increasing “creative accounting” costs are effective in curbing evasion when tax compliance is relatively high.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
Volume (Year): 81 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo
Tax evasion; Tax avoidance; Tax compliance; Sophisticated evasion;
Other versions of this item:
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
- H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Klepper, Steven & Mazur, Mark & Nagin, Daniel, 1991. "Expert Intermediaries and Legal Compliance: The Case of Tax Preparers," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 205-29, April.
- Friedrich Schneider, 2006.
"Shadow Economies and Corruption all over the World: What do we really Know?,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1806, CESifo Group Munich.
- Schneider, Friedrich G., 2007. "Shadow economies and corruption all over the world: what do we really know?," Economics Discussion Papers 2007-9, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
- Friedrich G. Schneider, 2006. "Shadow Economies and Corruption all over the World: What do we really know?," Economics working papers 2006-17, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Schneider, Friedrich, 2006. "Shadow Economies and Corruption All Over the World: What Do We Really Know?," IZA Discussion Papers 2315, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Martin Feldstein, 1995.
"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax,"
NBER Working Papers
5055, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Martin Feldstein, 1999. "Tax Avoidance And The Deadweight Loss Of The Income Tax," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 81(4), pages 674-680, November.
- Damjanovic, Tatiana & Ulph, David, 2010.
"Tax progressivity, income distribution and tax non-compliance,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 54(4), pages 594-607, May.
- Tatiana Damjanovic & David Ulph, 2009. "Tax Progressivity, Income Distribution and Tax Non-Compliance," Working Papers 0928, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
- Tatiana Damjanovic & David Ulph, 2007. "Tax Progressivity, Income Distribution and Tax Non-Compliance," Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics 200712, Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews.
- Joel Slemrod, 2004.
"The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness,"
NBER Working Papers
10858, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Andreoni, J. & Erard, B. & Feinstein, J., 1996.
9610, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Dominik H. Enste & Friedrich Schneider, 2000. "Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 77-114, March.
- Wojciech Kopczuk & Joel Slemrod, 2006. "Putting Firms into Optimal Tax Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 130-134, May.
- Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1986. "Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(3), pages 739-60, October.
- Keith J. Crocker & Joel Slemrod, 2004.
"Corporate Tax Evasion with Agency Costs,"
NBER Working Papers
10690, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Joel Slemrod & John D. Wilson, 2006.
"Tax Competition With Parasitic Tax Havens,"
NBER Working Papers
12225, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Friedrich Schneider & Dominik Enste, 2000. "Shadow Economies Around the World," IMF Working Papers 00/26, International Monetary Fund.
- Friedrich Schneider & Andreas Buehn & Claudio Montenegro, 2010. "New Estimates for the Shadow Economies all over the World," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(4), pages 443-461.
- Reinganum, Jennifer F. & Wilde, Louis L., 1990.
"Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in the Presence of Tax Practitioners,"
744, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1991. "Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in the Presence of Tax Practitioners," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 163-81, Spring.
- Kong-Pin & C.Y. Cyrus Chu, 2005. "Internal Control versus External Manipulation: A Model of Corporate Income Tax Evasion," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(1), pages 151-164, Spring.
- Lipatov, Vilen, 2006. "Tax Evasion and Coordination," MPRA Paper 1251, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2006.
- Carlo Fiorio & Stefano Iacus & Alessandro Santoro, 2013. "Taxpaying response of small firms to an increased probability of audit: some evidence from Italy," Working Papers 251, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2013.
- Vilen Lipatov, 2014. "Compliance Dynamics Generated by Social Interaction Rules," CESifo Working Paper Series 4767, CESifo Group Munich.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.