Tax Enforcement and Tax Havens under Formula Apportionment

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Tax Enforcement and Tax Havens under Formula Apportionment

Author Info

Becker, Johannes
Fuest, Clemens

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Clemens Fuest

Abstract

In this paper, we consider optimal tax enforcement policy in the presence of profit shifting towards tax havens. We show that, under separate accounting, tax enforcement levels may be too high due to negative fiscal externalities. In contrast, under formula apportionment, tax enforcement is likely to be too low due to positive externalities of tax enforcement. Our results challenge recent contributions arguing that, under formula apportionment, there is a tendency towards inefficiently high levels of (effective) tax rates. --

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Cologne, CPE - Cologne Center for Public Economics in its series FiFo-CPE Discussion Papers - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge with number 07-8.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zbw:uoccpe:6152

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.fifo-koeln.de/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (ZBW - German National Library for Economics).

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ACC-2007-10-20 (Accounting & Auditing)
NEP-ALL-2007-10-20 (All new papers)
NEP-PBE-2007-10-20 (Public Economics)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Clemens Fuest, 2008. "The European Commission´s Proposal for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base," Working Papers 0823, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Clemens Fuest, 2008. "The European Commission's proposal for a common consolidated corporate tax base," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(4), pages 720-739, winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can import bibliographic info in various formats into you bibliographic tool, or just into your word processor. See under "publisher info" on each abstract page.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.