Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Corporate income taxation of multinationals and unemployment

Contents:

Author Info

  • Eichner, Thomas
  • Runkel, Marco

Abstract

Within a two-country model with involuntary unemployment, this paper investigates corporate income taxation under separate accounting versus formula apportionment. In contrast to separate accounting, under formula apportionment the corporate tax policy causes a fiscal externality that results from unemployment. This externality is the highest when the apportionment formula contains the payroll factor only. It is minimized for the pure sales (property) formula, if the substitution elasticity is low (high). The unemployment externality tends to compensate other externalities such that tax rates become inefficiently low. The deviation from the efficient tax policy is minimized when the apportionment formula contains the sales factor only.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V89-4W1JVW9-1/2/1b29271ef329512df859cdf3b78e7de1
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Regional Science and Urban Economics.

Volume (Year): 39 (2009)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
Pages: 610-620

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:regeco:v:39:y:2009:i:5:p:610-620

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/regec

Related research

Keywords: Separate accounting Formula apportionment Unemployment;

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Rüdiger Pethig & Andreas Wagener, 2003. "Profit Tax Competition and Formula Apportionment," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 106-03, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht.
  2. Pinto, Santiago M., 2007. "Corporate profit tax, capital mobility, and formula apportionment," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 76-102, July.
  3. Austan Goolsbee & Edward L Maydew, 1998. "Coveting Thy Neighbor's Manuafacturing: The Dilemma of State Income Apportionment," NBER Working Papers 6614, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Huizinga, H. & Nielsen, S.B., 1995. "Capital Income and Profits Taxation with Foreign Ownership of Firms," Papers 9582, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  5. Huizinga, Harry & Nicodeme, Gaetan, 2006. "Foreign ownership and corporate income taxation: An empirical evaluation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(5), pages 1223-1244, July.
  6. Haufler, Andreas, 2006. "Die Besteuerung multinationaler Unternehmen," Discussion Papers in Economics 1153, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  7. Marcel G�rard, 2006. "Reforming the taxation of multijurisdictional enterprises in Europe: a tentative appraisal," European Economy - Economic Papers 265, Directorate General Economic and Monetary Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
  8. Kant, Chander, 1988. "Endogenous transfer pricing and the effects of uncertain regulation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 147-157, February.
  9. GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & VAN YPERSELE, Tanguy, 1994. "Social Protection and Political Competition," CORE Discussion Papers 1994057, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
  11. Haufler, Andreas & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2000. "Corporate Tax Systems and Cross Country Profit Shifting," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 306-25, April.
  12. Hines, James R. Jr., 1999. "Lessons from Behavioral Responses to International Taxation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 305-22, June Cita.
  13. Hans Jarle Kind & Helene Midelfart & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2004. "Corporate Tax Systems, Multinational Enterprises, and Economic Integration," CESifo Working Paper Series 1241, CESifo Group Munich.
  14. Robert Chirinko, 2002. "Corporate Taxation, Capital Formation, and the Substitution Elasticity between Labor and Capital," Emory Economics 0201, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
  15. Arjan Lejour & Harrie Verbon, 1996. "Capital mobility, wage bargaining, and social insurance policies in an economic union," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 495-513, October.
  16. Nonneman, Walter & Vanhoudt, Patrick, 1996. "A Further Augmentation of the Solow Model and the Empirics of Economic Growth for OECD Countries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(3), pages 943-53, August.
  17. Søren Bo Nielsen & Pascalis Raimondos-Møller & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2001. "Formula Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 491, CESifo Group Munich.
  18. Duffy, John & Papageorgiou, Chris, 2000. " A Cross-Country Empirical Investigation of the Aggregate Production Function Specification," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 87-120, March.
  19. N. Gregory Mankiw & David Romer & David N. Weil, 1992. "A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 3541, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Clemens Fuest & Bernd Huber, 1999. "Tax Coordination and Unemployment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 7-26, February.
  21. Gordon, Roger H & Wilson, John Douglas, 1986. "An Examination of Multijurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation under Formula Apportionment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1357-73, November.
  22. Ogawa, Hikaru & Sato, Yasuhiro & Tamai, Toshiki, 2006. "A note on unemployment and capital tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 350-356, September.
  23. Riedel, Nadine & Runkel, Marco, 2007. "Company tax reform with a water's edge," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(7-8), pages 1533-1554, August.
  24. Michael P. Devereux & Rachel Griffith & Alexander Klemm, 2002. "Corporate income tax reforms and international tax competition," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 17(35), pages 449-495, October.
  25. Mihir A. Desai & C. Fritz Foley & James R. Hines, 2004. "A Multinational Perspective on Capital Structure Choice and Internal Capital Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(6), pages 2451-2487, December.
  26. Clausing, Kimberly A., 2003. "Tax-motivated transfer pricing and US intrafirm trade prices," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2207-2223, September.
  27. Marcel Gérard, 2005. "Multijurisdictional Firms and Governments’ Strategies under Alternative Tax Designs," CESifo Working Paper Series 1527, CESifo Group Munich.
  28. Wolfgang Eggert & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2003. "Symmetric Tax Competition under Formula Apportionment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 439-446, 04.
  29. Nielsen, Søren Bo & Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2010. "Company taxation and tax spillovers: Separate accounting versus formula apportionment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 121-132, January.
  30. Fuest, Clemens & Huber, Bernd, 1999. "Tax Coordination and Unemployment," Munich Reprints in Economics 20298, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Nadine Riedel, 2011. "Taxing multinationals under union wage bargaining," Working Papers 1106, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
  2. Johannes Becker & Marco Runkel, 2010. "Corporate tax regime and international allocation of ownership," FEMM Working Papers 100014, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
  3. Caterina Liesegang & Marco Runkel, 2009. "Corporate Income Taxation of Multinationals and Fiscal Equalization," CESifo Working Paper Series 2747, CESifo Group Munich.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:regeco:v:39:y:2009:i:5:p:610-620. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.