In this paper we set up a symmetric two-country model with trade costs and international ownership to study the transfer pricing decisions by two multinationals operating in markets with Cournot competition. We let governments choose both the corporate profit tax rate and the level of enforcement of the "arm's length" principle and we examine how enforcement policies affect the tax competition game. Furthermore, we analyze in what direction economic integration, in terms of a reduction in trade costs and/or a larger international ownership of multinationals, influences the symmetric equilibrium level of the two policy instruments. We show that increased economic integration may lead to higher equilibrium tax rates, and that, as governments increase the level of enforcement, equilibrium tax rates increase as well. Moreover, we find that, when the two MNEs are not fully owned by domestic residents, trade liberalization decreases the equilibrium enforcement policy, while increased international ownership increases the level of enforcement.
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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number
2004069.
Find related papers by JEL classification: H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order; Noneconomic International Organizations;; Economic Integration and Globalization: General F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
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Gordon, Roger H. & Hines, James Jr, 2002.
"International taxation,"
Handbook of Public Economics,
in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 28, pages 1935-1995
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Roger H. Gordon & James R. Hines Jr., 2002.
"International Taxation,"
NBER Working Papers
8854, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)