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Why Corporate Taxes May Rise: The Case of Trade Liberalization and Foreign Ownership

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  • Schjelderup, Guttorm
  • Ulltveit-Moe, Karen Helene
  • Kind, Hans Jarle

Abstract

Almost all the literature on tax competition in the presence of multinationals (MNCs) and profit shifting ignores trade costs. This Paper studies how economic integration, in terms of reduced trade costs and internationalization of ownership, affects tax competition and equilibrium corporate taxes. We find that equilibrium taxes increase subsequent to a reduction of trade costs if MNCs are owned by home country residents and also subsequent to increased internationalisation of ownership.

Suggested Citation

  • Schjelderup, Guttorm & Ulltveit-Moe, Karen Helene & Kind, Hans Jarle, 2002. "Why Corporate Taxes May Rise: The Case of Trade Liberalization and Foreign Ownership," CEPR Discussion Papers 3383, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3383
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Haufler, Andreas & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2000. "Corporate Tax Systems and Cross Country Profit Shifting," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 306-325, April.
    2. James R. Markusen, 2004. "Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262633078, December.
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    4. Hines, James R. Jr., 1999. "Lessons From Behavioral Responses to International Taxation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 52(2), pages 305-322, June.
    5. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 52(2), pages 269-304, June.
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    7. Elitzur, Ramy & Mintz, Jack, 1996. "Transfer pricing rules and corporate tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 401-422, June.
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    9. Mintz, Jack & Smart, Michael, 2004. "Income shifting, investment, and tax competition: theory and evidence from provincial taxation in Canada," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(6), pages 1149-1168, June.
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    11. Janeba, Eckhard, 1998. "Tax competition in imperfectly competitive markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 135-153, February.
    12. Kashif S. Mansori & Alfons J. Weichenrieder, 2001. "Tax Competition and Transfer Pricing Disputes," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 58(1), pages 1-11, December.
    13. Kant, Chander, 1990. "Multinational firms and government revenues," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 135-147, July.
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    17. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Peralta, Susana & Wauthy, Xavier & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2006. "Should countries control international profit shifting?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 24-37, January.
    2. AMERIGHI, Oscar, 2004. "Transfer pricing and enforcement policy in oligopolistic markets," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2004069, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    International ownership; Trade liberalization; Multinational firms; Corporate taxes; International tax competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • F20 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - General
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General

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