Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Profit Shifting in the EU: Evidence from Germany

Contents:

Author Info

  • Alfons Weichenrieder

Abstract

The paper considers profit shifting behavior using data on German inbound and outbound FDI. It finds an empirical correlation between the home country tax rate of a parent and the net of tax profitability of its German affiliate that is consistent with profit shifting behavior. For profitable affiliates that are directly owned by a foreign investor the evidence suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in the parent's home country tax rate leads to roughly half a percentage point increase in the profitability of the German affiliate. On the outbound side of German FDI, the data provides some evidence that tax rate changes in the host country lead to a stronger change in after-tax profitability for affiliates that are wholly owned, which may reflect the larger flexibility of these firms in carrying out tax minimizing behavior without interference of minority owners.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2007/wp-cesifo-2007-07/cesifo1_wp2043.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 2043.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2043

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: +49 (89) 985369
Email:
Web page: http://www.cesifo.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: foreign direct investment; profit shifting; tax avoidance; multinational enterprise;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Huizinga, Harry & Laeven, Luc, 2007. "International Profit Shifting within European Multinationals," CEPR Discussion Papers 6048, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Wolfgang Eggert & Andreas Haufler, 2006. "Company-Tax Coordination cum Tax-Rate Competition in the European Union," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 62(4), pages 579-601, December.
  3. Jeremy S. S. Edwards & Alfons J. Weichenrieder, 2004. "Ownership Concentration and Share Valuation," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 5(2), pages 143-171, 05.
  4. Collins, Julie H. & Shackelford, Douglas A., 1997. "Global organizations and taxes: An analysis of the dividend, interest, royalty, and management fee payments between U.S. multinationals' foreign affiliates," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 151-173, December.
  5. Fred Ramb & Alfons J. Weichenrieder, 2005. "Taxes and the Financial Structure of German Inward FDI," Kiel Working Papers 1252, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  6. Guttorm Schjelderup & Alfons J. Weichenrieder, 1999. "Trade, Multinationals, and Transfer Pricing Regulations," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(3), pages 817-844, May.
  7. Elitzur, Ramy & Mintz, Jack, 1996. "Transfer pricing rules and corporate tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 401-422, June.
  8. James R. Hines, Jr. & Eric M. Rice, 1994. "Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Business," NBER Working Papers 3477, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Bartelsman, Eric J. & Beetsma, Roel M. W. J., 2003. "Why pay more? Corporate tax avoidance through transfer pricing in OECD countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2225-2252, September.
  10. Harris, D. & Morck, R. & Slemrod, J., 1991. "Income Shifting in U.S. Multinational Corporations," Working Papers 287, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
  11. Alberto Giovannini & R. Glenn Hubbard & Joel Slemrod, 1993. "Studies in International Taxation," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number giov93-1, October.
  12. Grubert, Harry & Mutti, John, 1991. "Taxes, Tariffs and Transfer Pricing in Multinational Corporate Decision Making," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(2), pages 285-93, May.
  13. Harry Grubert & Timothy Goodspeed & Deborah L. Swenson, 1993. "Explaining the Low Taxable Income of Foreign-Controlled Companies in the United States," NBER Chapters, in: Studies in International Taxation, pages 237-276 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Thiess Buettner & Martin Ruf, 2007. "Tax incentives and the location of FDI: Evidence from a panel of German multinationals," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 151-164, April.
  15. Donald Rousslang, 1997. "International income shifting by US multinational corporations," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(7), pages 925-934.
  16. Dworin, Lowell, 1990. "Transfer Pricing Issues," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 43(3), pages 285-91, September.
  17. Jack Mintz & Alfons Weichenrieder, 2005. "Taxation and the Financial Structure of German Outbound FDI," CESifo Working Paper Series 1612, CESifo Group Munich.
  18. Hines, James R. Jr., 1999. "Lessons from Behavioral Responses to International Taxation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 305-22, June Cita.
  19. Kashif S. Mansori & Alfons J. Weichenrieder, 2001. "Tax Competition and Transfer Pricing Disputes," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 58(1), pages 1-, December.
  20. Mihir A. Desai & C. Fritz Foley & James R. Hines, Jr., 2002. "The Costs of Shared Ownership: Evidence from International Joint Ventures," NBER Chapters, in: Corporate Alliances National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Jack M. Mintz, 2003. "Conduit Entities: Implications of Indirect Tax-Efficient Financing Structures for Real Investment," International Tax Program Papers 0410, International Tax Program, Institute for International Business, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, revised Sep 2004.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2043. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julio Saavedra).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.