Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Tax enforcement and tax havens under formula apportionment

Contents:

Author Info

  • Johannes Becker

    ()

  • Clemens Fuest

    ()

Abstract

In this paper, we consider optimal tax enforcement policy in the presence of profit shifting towards tax havens. We show that, under separate accounting, tax enforcement levels may be too high due to negative fiscal externalities. In contrast, under formula apportionment, tax enforcement is likely to be too low due to positive externalities of tax enforcement. Our results challenge recent contributions arguing that, under formula apportionment, there is a tendency towards inefficiently high levels of (effective) tax rates. --

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10797-009-9121-4
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.

Volume (Year): 17 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 217-235

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:17:y:2010:i:3:p:217-235

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102915

Related research

Keywords: Corporate taxation; Foreign direct investment; H25; F23;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Nielsen, Søren Bo & Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis & Schjederup, Guttorm, 2000. "Formula Apportionment And Transfer Pricing Under Oligopolistic Competition," Working Papers 18-2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
  2. Huizinga, H.P. & Nielsen, S.B., 1997. "Capital income and profit taxation with foreign ownership of firms," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-73857, Tilburg University.
  3. Johannes Becker & Clemens Fuest, 2010. "Tax enforcement and tax havens under formula apportionment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 217-235, June.
  4. Joel Slemrod & John D. Wilson, 2006. "Tax Competition With Parasitic Tax Havens," NBER Working Papers 12225, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Gordon, Roger H & Wilson, John Douglas, 1986. "An Examination of Multijurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation under Formula Apportionment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1357-73, November.
  6. Riedel, Nadine & Runkel, Marco, 2007. "Company tax reform with a water's edge," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(7-8), pages 1533-1554, August.
  7. Peralta, Susana & Wauthy, Xavier & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2006. "Should countries control international profit shifting?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 24-37, January.
  8. Michael Devereux, 2004. "Debating Proposed Reforms of the Taxation of Corporate Income in the European Union," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 71-89, January.
  9. Jack M. Mintz, 1999. "Globalization of the Corporate Income Tax: The Role of Allocation," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 56(3/4), pages 389-, July.
  10. Wolfgang Eggert & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2003. "Symmetric Tax Competition under Formula Apportionment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 439-446, 04.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Shafik Hebous & Vilen Lipatov, 2011. "A Journey from a Corruption Port to a Tax Haven," CESifo Working Paper Series 3620, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Johannes Becker & Marco Runkel, 2010. "Corporate tax regime and international allocation of ownership," Working Papers 1010, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
  3. Leon Bettendorf & Albert Van Der Horst & Ruud A. De Mooij & Hendrik Vrijburg, 2010. "Corporate Tax Consolidation and Enhanced Cooperation in the European Union," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 31(4), pages 453-479, December.
  4. Matthias Wrede, 2009. "Asymmetric Tax Competition with Formula Apportionment," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200943, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  5. Clemens Fuest, 2008. "The European Commission's proposal for a common consolidated corporate tax base," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(4), pages 720-739, winter.
  6. Becker, Johannes & Fuest, Clemens, 2007. "Tax Enforcement and Tax Havens under Formula Apportionment," FiFo Discussion Papers - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 07-8, University of Cologne, FiFo Institute for Public Economics.
  7. Shafik Hebous, 2011. "Money at the Docks of Tax Havens: A Guide," CESifo Working Paper Series 3587, CESifo Group Munich.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:17:y:2010:i:3:p:217-235. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.