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Incentive compensation in a corporate hierarchy

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Author Info
Gibbs, Michael

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V87-3YB56NK-4/2/e223d1bbdd7609e7489e12fcf50e4d93
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Accounting and Economics.

Volume (Year): 19 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (April)
Pages: 247-277
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:19:y:1995:i:2-3:p:247-277

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  1. Christian Belzil & Michael Bognanno, 2006. "Promotions, Demotions, Halo Effects and Earnings Dynamics of American Executives," Working Papers 0606, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Jan Zabojnik, 2008. "Promotion Tournaments in Market Equilibrium," Working Papers 1193, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Christian Belzil & Michael Bognanno, 2004. "The Promotion Dynamics of American Executives," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-05, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. DeVaro, Jed & Waldman, Michael, 2006. "The signaling role of promotions: Further theory and empirical evidence," MPRA Paper 1550, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Anders Frederiksen & Elod Takats, 2005. "Layoffs as Part of an Optimal Incentive Mix: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 881, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Canice Prendergast, 1996. "What Happens Within Firms? A Survey of Empirical Evidence on Compensation Policies," NBER Working Papers 5802, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Alberto Bayo-Moriones & Pedro Ortín-Ángel, 2003. "Internal promotion versus external recruitment: evidence in industrial plants," Working Papers 200303, Department of Business Economics, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona. [Downloadable!]
  8. Leuven, Edwin & Oosterbeek, Hessel & Sonnemans, Joep & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2008. "Incentives versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 3326, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Robert Gibbons, 1997. "Incentives and Careers in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 5705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Pablo Acosta, 2004. "Promotions, State Dependence and Intrafirm Job Mobility: Evidence From Personnel Records," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 585, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  11. Dohmen, Thomas J., 2003. "Performance, Seniority and Wages: Formal Salary Systems and Individual Earnings Profiles," IZA Discussion Papers 935, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Christian Belzil & Michael Bognanno, 2008. "Promotions, Demotions, Halo Effects and the Earnings Dynamics of American executives," Post-Print halshs-00354270_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  13. Edward P. Lazear & Paul Oyer, 2003. "Internal and External Labor Markets: A Personnel Economics Approach," NBER Working Papers 10192, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Felipe Balmaceda, . "Compensation Methods in Competitive Labor Markert," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv118, Ilades-Georgetown University, School of Economics and Bussines. [Downloadable!]
  15. Julia Nafziger, 2008. "Job Assignments, Intrinsic Motivation and Explicit Incentives," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse5_2008, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  16. Felipe Balmaceda, 2002. "Compensation Methods in a Competitive Labor Market: the Role of Asymmetric Information," Documentos de Trabajo 139, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. [Downloadable!]
  17. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 1998. "A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics in Internal Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 6454, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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