Export Taxes under Bertrand Duopoly
AbstractThis article analyses export taxes in a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation, where a home and a foreign firm both export to a third-country market. It is shown that the maximum-revenue export tax always exceeds the optimum-welfare export tax. In a Nash equilibrium in export taxes, the country with the low cost firm imposes the largest export tax. The results under Bertrand duopoly are compared with those under Cournot duopoly. It is shown that the absolute value of the export subsidy or tax under Cournot duopoly exceeds the export tax under Bertrand duopoly.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section in its series Cardiff Economics Working Papers with number E2006/15.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Economics Bulletin , Vol. 6, No. 6, pp. 1-8, 2006.
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Web page: http://business.cardiff.ac.uk/research/academic-sections/economics/working-papers
More information through EDIRC
Trade Policy; Imperfect Competition; Oligopoly;
Other versions of this item:
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-02-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-IND-2006-02-26 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-INT-2006-02-26 (International Trade)
- NEP-MIC-2006-02-26 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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