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Welfare Ranking of Alternative Export Taxes Revisited

Author

Listed:
  • Anomita Ghosh

    (Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA)

  • Rupayan Pal

    (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai)

Abstract

This paper revisits the welfare ranking of revenue maximizing export tax and welfare maximizing export tax in an imperfectly substitutable network goods oligopoly. The results are often strikingly different and opposite to the ones obtained from a similar comparison in non-network goods oligopoly.

Suggested Citation

  • Anomita Ghosh & Rupayan Pal, 2017. "Welfare Ranking of Alternative Export Taxes Revisited," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(2), pages 1033-1044.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-17-00359
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Network externalities; differentiated product; oligopoly; export-rivalry; trade policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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