Strategic Export Policy in a Differentiated Duopoly: A Note
AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to further explore how optimal export policies are affected by the nature of oligopolistic competition and the structure of demand. It is shown that (1) the more cost-competitive the home firm is, the higher the optimal level of export intervention becomes; (2) as the goods become better complements, the optimal level of export intervention increases; (3) the nature of the effects of strategic export policies on foreign firms depends on both the mode of competition and the structure of demand. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Open Economies Review.
Volume (Year): 9 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100323
strategic export policy; substitutes and complements; Cournot and Bertrand competition;
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