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Maximum-Revenue versus Optimum-Welfare Export Taxes

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Author Info
Clarke, Roger () (Cardiff Business School)
Collie, David R. () (Cardiff Business School)

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Abstract

In a game between two exporting countries, both countries may be better off if they both delegate to policymakers who maximise tax revenue rather than welfare. However, both countries delegating to policymakers who maximise revenue is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium. The game may be a prisoner's dilemma where both countries are better off delegating to policymakers who maximise revenue, but both will delegate to policymakers who maximise welfare in the Nash equilibrium. This result is obtained in the Bertrand duopoly model of Eaton and Grossman (1986) and the perfectly competitive model of Panagariya and Schiff (1995).

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File URL: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/carbs/econ/workingpapers/papers/E2006_22.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section in its series Cardiff Economics Working Papers with number E2006/22.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Review of International Economics, Vol. 16, No. 5, pp. 919-929.
Handle: RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2006/22

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Related research
Keywords: Trade Policy; Export Taxes; Game Theory; Delegation;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Panagariya, Arvind & Schiff, Maurice, 1994. "Can revenue maximizing export taxes yield higher welfare than welfare maximizing export taxes?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 79-84, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Roger Clarke & David R. Collie, 2006. "Optimum-Welfare And Maximum-Revenue Tariffs Under Bertrand Duopoly," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 53(3), pages 398-408, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Roger Clarke & David Collie, 2006. "Export Taxes under Bertrand Duopoly," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 6(6), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Collie, David, 1991. "Optimum Welfare and Maximum Revenue Tariffs under Oligopoly," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 38(4), pages 398-401, November.
  5. Eaton, Jonathan & Grossman, Gene M, 1986. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 383-406, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Collie, David R & Roger Clarke, 2003. "Product Differentiation and the Gains from Trade under Bertrand Duopoly," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 47, Royal Economic Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. David R. Collie, 1997. "Delegation And Strategic Trade Policy," International Economic Journal, Korean International Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 35-46, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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