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Optimum Welfare and Maximum Revenue Tariffs under Oligopoly

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  • Collie, David

Abstract

A well-known proposition in conventional trade theory, H. G. Johnson (1951-52), is that the maximum revenue tariff exceeds the optimum welfare tariff. The purpose of this paper is to show that under oligopoly the optimum welfare tariff may exceed the maximum revenue tariff due to the profit-shifting effect. Copyright 1991 by Scottish Economic Society.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Scottish Economic Society in its journal Scottish Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 38 (1991)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 398-401

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Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:38:y:1991:i:4:p:398-401

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Cited by:
  1. Wang, Leonard F.S. & Lee, Jen-Yao, 2012. "Domestic entry, optimum-welfare and maximum-revenue tariffs," Research in Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 106-109.
  2. David Collie & Roger Clarke, 2006. "Export Taxes under Bertrand Duopoly," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 6(6), pages 1-8.
  3. Dinlersoz, Emin & Dogan, Can, 2010. "Tariffs versus anti-dumping duties," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 436-451, June.
  4. Peter Neary & Dermot Leahy, 2010. "Oligopoly and Trade," Economics Series Working Papers 517, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  5. Leonard Wang & Jen-yao Lee & Chin-shu Huang, 2012. "Maximum-Revenue and Optimum-Welfare Tariffs in International Mixed Duopoly: Does the Order of Firms’ Move Matter?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 273-283, September.
  6. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:6:y:2008:i:38:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Collie, David R. & Vandenbussche, Hylke, 2006. "Tariffs and the Byrd amendment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 750-758, September.
  8. Roger Clarke & David R. Collie, 2008. "Maximum-revenue versus Optimum-welfare Export Taxes: a Delegation Game," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(5), pages 919-929, November.
  9. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:6:y:2006:i:6:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Leonard F. S. Wang & Wei Zhao & Ya -Chin Wang, 2008. "Strategic Trade Policy in Bargaining over Managerial Delegation Competition," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 6(38), pages 1-8.
  11. Leonard Wang & Ya-Chin Wang & Lihong Zhao, 2009. "Market Share Delegation and Strategic Trade Policy," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 49-56, March.

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