Repayment Incentives And The Distribution Of Gains From Group Lending
AbstractGroup loans with joint liability have been a distinguishing feature of many micro nance programs. While such lending has bene tted millions of borrowers, major lending insti- tutions have acknowledged their limited impact among the very poor and have recently favored individual contracts. This paper attempts to understand these empirical patterns using a model in which there is a single investment project and access to credit is limited by weak repayment incentives. We show that in the absence of large social sanctions, the poorest borrowers are o ered individual and not group contracts. When both types of contracts are feasible, the relative gains from group loans are shown to be decreasing in loan size. We compare the role of bank enforcement with social sanctions and nd that bank enforcement is more e ective in increasing outreach while social sanctions raise the welfare of infra-marginal borrowers. Finally, we explore the welfare e ects of group size and nd that those requiring small loans are better served by larger groups but group size e ects are, in general, ambiguous.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics in its series Working papers with number 192.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2010
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Baland, Jean-Marie & Somanathan, Rohini & Wahhaj, Zaki, 2013. "Repayment incentives and the distribution of gains from group lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 131-139.
- Baland, Jean-Marie & Somanathan, Rohini & Wahhaj, Zaki, 2011. "Repayment incentives and the distribution of gains from group lending," CEPR Discussion Papers 8197, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- O16 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2011-02-19 (Banking)
- NEP-CIS-2011-02-19 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-CTA-2011-02-19 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MFD-2011-02-19 (Microfinance)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Thiemo Fetzer & Maitreesh Ghatak & Jonathan de Quidt, 2013.
"Group Lending Without Joint Liability,"
STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series
44, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Vinayan. K.P).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.