Repayment and Exclusion in a Microfinance Experiment
AbstractMicrofinance groups often engage in a variety of collective activities not directly related to credit. Groups can sanction members who default on their loans by excluding them from these activities. Our experiment is designed to explore the effectiveness of such sanctions in improving repayment incentives. Groups of 10 members are provided with joint-liability loans for a specific investment project. If groups repay their loans, contributing members have the option of excluding other members and those that remain play a public goods game. By varying loan sizes across groups and allowing for heterogeneous gains from the public good within groups, we identify the role of incentives in repayment decisions. In line with theoretical predictions, groups with the largest repayment burdens have the highest default rates and within groups, individual decisions to contribute to loan repayment depend on gains from the public good game.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Monash University, Department of Economics in its series Monash Economics Working Papers with number 12-13.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: May 2013
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, Monash University, Victoria 3800, Australia
Web page: http://www.buseco.monash.edu.au/eco/
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-05-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2013-05-19 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-MFD-2013-05-19 (Microfinance)
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- Sugato Chakravarty & S. M. Zahid Iqbal & Abu Zafar M. Shahriar, 2013. "Are Women “Naturally” Better Credit Risks in Microcredit? Evidence from Field Experiments in Patriarchal and Matrilineal Societies in Bangladesh," Working Papers 1019, Purdue University, Department of Consumer Sciences.
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