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Wages and return to work of injured workers

Author

Listed:
  • Monica Galizzi
  • Roberto Leombruni
  • Lia Pacelli
  • Antonella Bena

Abstract

This is the first analysis of determinants of the return to work of injured workers in an institutional setting where workers earnings are fully compensated during the disability spell. Employers carry the costs associated to the time off work; hence they could face an incentive to put pressure on workers to shorten their leave. We use a matched employer-employees panel data merged with Italian workers compensation records. We find that even when we control for measures of commitment and job security, workers with high wages and high relative wages (who are more costly for the employer) return to work sooner.

Suggested Citation

  • Monica Galizzi & Roberto Leombruni & Lia Pacelli & Antonella Bena, 2014. "Wages and return to work of injured workers," LABORatorio R. Revelli Working Papers Series 139, LABORatorio R. Revelli, Centre for Employment Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:cca:wplabo:139
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Return to Work; Injury; Workers’ Compensation; Relative wages; Commitment; Hazard models;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J28 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy

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