The Impact of Mergers and Acquisitions on Executive Pay in the United Kingdom
AbstractWe examine the impact of acquisitions on executive pay in UK acquirers over 1984-2001. For the overall sample, which includes foreign, domestic, public and private targets, there is a significant transitory pay increase. Pay changes are not affected by target nationality or organizational form, although initial cross-border acquisitions do result in higher pay. Pay increases are higher following acquisitions of targets with high pay, but not of targets in high pay countries. CEOs are rewarded equally for bad and good acquisitions, and those well rewarded are more likely to reacquire. However, bad acquisitions do not on average increase CEO wealth because of an offsetting decline in CEO shareholding value. Pay impacts are not affected by the corporate governance characteristics of the acquiring firm.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ESRC Centre for Business Research in its series ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers with number wp354.
Date of creation: Sep 2007
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Executive compensation; acquisitions; cross-border; private; corporate governance;
Other versions of this item:
- Paul M. Guest, 2009. "The Impact of Mergers and Acquisitions on Executive Pay in the United Kingdom," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 76(301), pages 149-175, 02.
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-11-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2007-11-10 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2007-11-10 (Industrial Competition)
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- Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2013. "Bad Mergers Revisited: An Incentive Perspective," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79914, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Ozkan, Neslihan, 2012. "Do CEOs gain more in foreign acquisitions than domestic acquisitions?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 1122-1138.
- Andy Cosh & Paul Guest & Alan Hughes, 2007. "UK Corporate Governance and Takeover Performance," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp357, ESRC Centre for Business Research.
- Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2013. "Merger Efficiency and Managerial Incentives," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 410, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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