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Total Board Remuneration and Company Performance

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Author Info
Main, Brian G M
Bruce, Alistair
Buck, Trevor
Abstract

Using a hitherto neglected source of data, this paper combines executive emoluments with executive options to construct a broader measure of executive pay than has been possible in earlier British studies. The result of including the long-term share option component of pay along with the more commonly utilized short-term component of emoluments is to reveal executive pay as being significantly more sensitive to company performance than has previously been thought to be the case. The paper questions the current policy stance of British institutional investors and of the Greenbury Committee with respect to executive share options. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 106 (1996)
Issue (Month): 439 (November)
Pages: 1627-44
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Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:106:y:1996:i:439:p:1627-44

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  1. Andrea E. Goldstein, 2000. "Corporate Governance and Regulation in Privatized Utilities: Telecommunications in Four European Countries," Business and Politics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 2(2), pages 189-223. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. M. Ali Choudhary & J. Michael Orszag, 2003. "Are Performance Conditions On Executive Options Driven By Fundamentals?," Department of Economics Discussion Papers 1103, Department of Economics, University of Surrey. [Downloadable!]
  3. Paul Gregg & Sarah Jewell & Ian Tonks, 2005. "Executive Pay and Performance in the UK 1994-2002," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 05/122, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
  4. Yishay Yafeh & Oved Yosha, 2003. "Large Shareholders and Banks: Who Monitors and How?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(484), pages 128-146, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Frederick Guy, 2000. "CEO Pay, Shareholder Returns, and Accounting Profits," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 7(3), pages 263-274, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Fred Guy, 2000. "CEO Pay, Shareholder Returns and Accounting Profitability," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp155, ESRC Centre for Business Research. [Downloadable!]
  7. Giorgio Canarella & Mahmoud M. Nourayi, 2008. "Executive compensation and firm performance: adjustment dynamics, non-linearity and asymmetry," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(4), pages 293-315. [Downloadable!]
  8. Kevin Amess & Leigh Drake, 2003. "Executive Remuneration And Firm Performance: Evidence From A Panel Of Mutual Organisations," Discussion Papers in Economics 03/13, Department of Economics, University of Leicester. [Downloadable!]
  9. Suwina Cheng & Michael Firth, 2006. "Family ownership, corporate governance, and top executive compensation," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(7), pages 549-561. [Downloadable!]
  10. Girma, Sourafel & Thompson, Steve & Wright, Peter, 2002. "Merger Activity and Executive Pay," CEPR Discussion Papers 3255, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Frederick Guy, 1999. "Earnings Distribution, Corporate Governance and CEO Pay," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp126, ESRC Centre for Business Research. [Downloadable!]
  12. Phillip J. Mcknight, Cyril Tomkins, 1999. "Top Executive Pay in the United Kingdom: A Corporate Governance Dilemma," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 6(2), pages 223-243, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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