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UK Corporate Governance and Takeover Performance

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Author Info

  • Andy Cosh
  • Paul Guest
  • Alan Hughes

Abstract

This chapter addresses the changing nature of corporate governance in the United Kingdom over recent decades and examines whether these changes have had an impact on the UK market for corporate control. The disappointing outcomes for acquiring company shareholders in the majority of corporate acquisitions, public discontent with some pay deals for top executives and some high profile corporate scandals led in the early 1990s to a call for governance reform. The scrutiny of governance in UK companies has intensified since the publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992 and has resulted in calls for changes in the size, composition and role of boards of directors, in the role of institutional shareholders, the remuneration and appointment of executives, and in legal and accounting regulations. We review the background to these changes and the consequences of the changes since 1990 for governance structures. Finally, we examine whether these changes have affected takeover performance in recent years. Our analysis is specific to the institutional circumstances of the UK although we refer where appropriate to takeover studies in other countries.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by ESRC Centre for Business Research in its series ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers with number wp357.

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Date of creation: Dec 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp357

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Web page: http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/

Related research

Keywords: Corporate governance; takeovers; UK; financial performance; Cadbury;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Crafts, Nicholas, 2012. "British relative economic decline revisited: The role of competition," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 17-29.
  2. Andy Cosh & Alan Hughes, 2008. "Takeovers after "Takeovers"," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp363, ESRC Centre for Business Research.
  3. Crafts, Nicholas, 2011. "British Relative Economic Decline Revisited," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 42, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).

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