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Sequential Auctions with Endogenously Determined Reserve Prices

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Author Info
Rasim Ozcan (Boston College)

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Abstract

This paper models an auction game in which two identical licenses for participating in an oligopolistic market are sold in a sequential auction. There is no incumbent. The auction for the first license is a standard first-price, sealed-bid type with an exogenously set reserve price, while the second uses the price of the first unit as the reserve price. This auction rule mimics the license auction for the Turkish Global Mobile Telecommunications in 2000. For some parameter values of the model, this auction setup generates less or equal revenue as selling the monopoly right with the second-price, sealed-bid auction. However, for other parameter values, the seller may get higher revenues.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Boston College Department of Economics in its series Boston College Working Papers in Economics with number 592.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 05 Apr 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:592

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Related research
Keywords: Auctions; Sequential First-Price Auctions; Endogenous Reserve Prices;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General

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  1. Val Lambson & Norman K Thurston, 2006. "Sequential Auctions: Theory and Evidence from the Seattle Fur Exchange," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 70-80, Spring.
  2. Gerard J. van den Berg & Jan C. van Ours & Menno P. Pradhan, 2001. "The Declining Price Anomaly in Dutch Dutch Rose Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1055-1062, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. McAfee, R. Preston & Vincent, Daniel, 1997. "Sequentially Optimal Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 246-276, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Varian, Hal R, 1980. "A Model of Sales," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 651-59, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Bernhardt, Dan & Scoones, David, 1994. "A Note on Sequential Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 653-57, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik Morch, 1994. "Predatory Bidding in Sequential Auctions," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(3), pages 345-56, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2000. "Auctions with Downstream Interaction Among Buyers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 768-791, Winter.
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  8. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Gandal, Neil, 1997. "Sequential Auctions of Interdependent Objects: Israeli Cable Television Licenses," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(3), pages 227-44, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Professor Paul Klemperer, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Microeconomics 0004008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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