Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Centralized common pool management and local community participation

Contents:

Author Info

  • Vyrastekova,J.
  • Soest,D. van

    (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

Abstract

We use common-pool resource experiments to explore whether allowing resource users to vote on a natural resource management institution’s incentive structure enhances the ef- ficiency of resource use. We hypothesize that voting enables users to communicate their willingness to limit excess resource exploitation. Compared to games in which appropriate incentives are imposed exogenously, behavior is more cooperative conditional on a majority having voted for that structure. However, the effectiveness of this form of local community participation in resource management is limited as in more than half of the cases, only a minority votes in favor of implementing that incentive structure.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/papers/files/imw-wp-335.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers with number 335.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:335

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Postfach 10 01 31, 33501 Bielefeld
Phone: +49(0)521-106-4907
Web page: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Cherry, Todd L. & Cotten, Stephen J. & Jones, Luke R., 2013. "The appropriation of endogenously provided common-pool resources," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 329-341.
  2. Eline van der Heijden & Jan Potters & Martin Sefton, 2006. "Hierarchy and Opportunism in Teams," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2006-15, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  3. Velez, Maria Alejandra & Stranlund, John K. & Murphy, James J., 2012. "Preferences for government enforcement of a common pool harvest quota: Theory and experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 185-192.
  4. Gregor Schwerhoff, 2013. "Leadership and International Climate Cooperation," Working Papers 2013.97, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  5. Galinato, Gregmar I., 2011. "Endogenous property rights regimes, common-pool resources and trade," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(5), pages 951-962, March.
  6. Heijden, E.C.M. van der & Moxnes, E., 2011. "Leading by Example to Protect the Environment; Do the Costs of Leading Matter?," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2011-043, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  7. Juan Camilo C�rdenas, 2009. "Experiments in Environment and Development," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 157-182, 09.
  8. Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levati & Matthias Sutter & Eline van der Heijden, 2006. "Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group 2006-35, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  9. Noussair, C.N. & Soest, D.P. van, 2014. "Economic Experiments and Environmental Policy: A Review," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2014-001, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  10. d'Adda, Giovanna, 2011. "Motivation crowding in environmental protection: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(11), pages 2083-2097, September.
  11. Klaus Moeltner & James J. Murphy & John K. Stranlund & Maria Alejandra Velez, 2007. "Processing Data from Social Dilemma Experiments: A Bayesian Comparison of Parametric Estimators," Working Papers, University of Nevada, Reno, Department of Economics;University of Nevada, Reno , Department of Resource Economics 07-013, University of Nevada, Reno, Department of Economics;University of Nevada, Reno , Department of Resource Economics.
  12. Vollan, Bjørn, 2008. "Socio-ecological explanations for crowding-out effects from economic field experiments in southern Africa," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(4), pages 560-573, November.
  13. Klaus Moeltner & James J. Murphy & John K. Stranlund & Maria Alejandra Velez, 2012. "Institutional Heterogeneity in Social Dilemma Games: A Bayesian Examination," Working Papers 2012-04, University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:335. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dr. Frederik Herzberg).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.