Endogenous property rights regimes, common-pool resources and trade
AbstractA model is developed where opening to trade affects a dynamic common-pool resource stock and welfare through a community's voting decision to institute a property rights regime regulating the stock. The model finds that resource stock levels can decline even when a Markov perfect equilibrium path for labor and property rights regimes are chosen to maximize welfare. Thus, opening to trade can be welfare maximizing even when resource stock declines. Experimental results show that under certain conditions, subjects briefly follow a Markov perfect equilibrium path for property rights regime choice but labor allocations are myopically chosen indicating that some resource dynamics may be considered by subjects.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Ecological Economics.
Volume (Year): 70 (2011)
Issue (Month): 5 (March)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon
Dynamic resource stock Common-pool resources Property rights;
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